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NOTE
IRRELEVANT OVERSIGHT: "PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION" FROM THE STANDPOINT OF
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW
Daniel P. Rathbun*
The president is now regularly and heavily involved in the decision-
making processes of administrative agencies. What began in the
mid-twentieth century as macro-level oversight has evolved, since
the Reagan Administration, into controlling case-level influence.
Scholars have hotly debated the legality of this shift and have com-
pellingly demonstrated the need to ensure that agencies remain
accountable and that their decisions remain nonarbitrary in the
face of presidential involvement. However, as this Note demon-
strates, the existing scholarship has not provided an adequate
solution to these twin problems.
This Note provides a novel and effective solution to the account-
ability and arbitrariness problems of presidential involvement by
re-examining the doctrine of arbitrary and capricious review. Con-
trary to contemporary practice, this Note argues that while
arbitrary and capricious review is never directly applicable to the
president's actions, it is always applicable to agency decisions that
the president has influenced. It introduces a bifurcated framework
for applying arbitrary and capricious review based on an initial de-
termination of whether Congress has delegated directive authority
to the president or the agency. It then demonstrates that arbitrary
and capricious review is a better solution to the accountability and
arbitrariness problems of presidential involvement than other sug-
gestions in the existing literature.
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INTRODUCTION
The intensification of presidential involvement in agency decision mak-
ing is one of the most pronounced developments in the past half-century of
American administrative law. What began in the mid-twentieth century as
macro-level oversight has morphed, since the Reagan Administration, into
controlling, case-level influence.' Scholars have recognized the magnitude
of this transition, and the debate over its legality is now long standing. Some
laud the stabilizing tendencies of intensive presidential involvement and
justify it by reference to constitutional language.2 Others condemn it as un-
constitutional overreaching and decry its disruptive policy implications.'
1. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003).
2. E.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical hIvesti-
gation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821, 823 n.6 (2003); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
3. E.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, If at First You Don't Succeed, Sign an Executive Order:
President Bush and the Expansion of Charitable Choice, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1103, 1144-
51 (2007); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696 (2007); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 107 MIcH L. REv. 53 (2008) (explaining that some level of agency insulation is pref-
erable to absolute presidential control for maximizing the overlap between voters' policy
preferences and agencies' policy decisions).
[Vol. 107:643
Irrelevant Oversight
While the debate rages on, however, "Presidential Administration" has be-
come a fact of life.4
Accepting this, most contemporary scholars have focused on defining
the necessary limitations on presidential involvement and elucidating the
best means of effectuating them.' These scholars have compellingly articu-
lated the need to ensure that agency decisions remain accountable 6 and
nonarbitrary7 in the face of presidential involvement. Their proposed solu-
tions have spanned the map, meanwhile, and have drawn as heavily from the
Framers' intent as from contemporary statutes and case law.' But these
scholars have given short shrift to what is perhaps the most obvious and
practical means of ensuring accountability and nonarbitrariness: the doctrine
of arbitrary and capricious review, which requires agencies to base their de-
cisions upon relevant factors.9 While arbitrary and capricious review is never
directly applicable to the president's actions, ° it is always applicable to
agency decisions-including those that the president has influenced."
Scholars have failed to recognize the full implications of this point,' 2 and the
judiciary has shown undue reluctance to apply arbitrary and capricious re-
view in cases of presidential involvement." As a result, the limits on
presidential involvement remain both ambiguous and insufficient. 14
This Note argues that arbitrary and capricious review can be easily and
appropriately applied to agency decisions, even in cases of presidential
4. Kagan, supra note 2, at 2383-84. Elena Kagan coined the term "Presidential Administra-
tion" as a reference to the modem administrative state and the high degree of presidential
involvement in agency decision making. Id.
5. Bressman, supra note 1, at 534 (arguing that agencies should provide standards limiting
their own and the president's decision-making discretion); Kagan, supra note 2, at 2376-77 (sug-
gesting that courts should reserve Chevron deference for cases involving overt presidential
involvement); Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 Co-
LUM. L. REV. 263, 314 (2006) ("Several formal features of the broad Skidmore standard could
provide a baseline for agency consideration of the presidential directives that do not legally bind the
agency's discretion.").
6. Kagan, supra note 2, at 2333. The accountability critique of presidential involvement is
explained in Section II.A.
7. Bressman, supra note 1, at 503-04. The arbitrariness critique of presidential involvement
is explained in Section lI.B.
8. See sources cited supra note 5.
9. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
10. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
11. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") provides that arbitrary and capricious review
is applicable to all categories of agency decision making. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 706 (2006). For an
explanation of the four main categories-formal adjudication, informal adjudication, formal rule-
making, and informal rulemaking-see infra Section I.A. For informal agency decisions, arbitrary
and capricious review is the only APA-prescribed standard of review. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706. In as-
serting that the APA is "always" applicable to agency decisions, I assume for the sake of analysis
that the exceptions in § 701(a)(1) (for decisions made nonreviewable by statute) and § 701(a)(2) (for
decisions "committed to agency discretion by law") do not apply.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 173-180.
13. See infra Section l.B; infra note 100 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Section 111.B; infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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involvement; that courts are not currently applying it as fully or as broadly
as they should; and that, if meaningfully applied, such review would best
address the accountability and arbitrariness concerns of contemporary
scholars. Part I examines the origins and structure of presidential involve-
ment in agency decision making and describes the administrative context in
which it takes place. Part II outlines the contemporary debate over presiden-
tial involvement, breaking the debate into critiques based on accountability
and arbitrariness, and shows why previously suggested solutions to these
critiques are insufficient to address the problems they raise. Part III con-
cludes by applying arbitrary and capricious review to develop a novel and
effective solution to the accountability and arbitrariness critiques of presi-
dential involvement.
I. THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT
The president's involvement in agency decision making is enabled,
shaped, and limited by the characteristics of agencies themselves. This Part
aims to situate the intensification of presidential involvement in relevant
administrative context. Section L.A describes the birth and development of
the administrative state. It explains how informal rulemaking became the
predominant form of agency decision making and hence the focal point of
presidential involvement. It also shows how courts expanded on the proce-
dural requirements for informal rulemaking and how these requirements
provided the foundation for modern arbitrary and capricious review. Section
1.8 explores the historical evolution of the administrative state, explaining
the emergence and intensification of presidential involvement as a logical
outgrowth from earlier administrative models but an imperfect means of
correcting their deficiencies.
A. The Birth of the Administrative Agency and the Predominance of
Informal Rulemaking
Though now taken for granted as a necessary and large part of the fed-
eral government, administrative agencies are in fact a relatively recent
phenomenon." In the 1930s and 1940s, the government's recognition of new
social and economic rights and assumption of new positive duties led to a
large increase in government work.' 6 Congress in turn delegated much of
this work to newly created agencies. 7 The popularity of the initial New Deal
agencies would wane in the ensuing years." However, once the Supreme
Court had assuaged the separation-of-powers concerns that attended its ini-
tial emergence, the burgeoning administrative state had a green light for
15. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 18 (6th
ed. 2006).
16. Seeid. at 18-19.
17. See id.
18. Id.
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development.' 9 And develop it did. Today, more than two million people
work in administrative agencies, regulating everything from labor relations
to environmental policy.' ° The work of the federal government is, in a very
real sense, the work of agencies.
The work of agencies has also largely assumed a common form-
informal rulemaking 2 -which today serves as the focal point of presidential
involvement. Passed in 1946 as an attempt to rein in administrative discre-
tion, the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") establishes the procedural
framework that agencies must abide by in exercising their quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial authority.22 It delineates four categories of agency deci-
sion making: formal rulemaking, informal rulemaking, formal adjudication,
and informal adjudication.23 The requirements of formal decision making are
relatively demanding. They impose record keeping and evidentiary stan-
dards akin to those that would accompany a trial or the passage of
legislation.24 The requirements of informal decision making, by contrast, are
decidedly minimal.25 In grappling with the APA's procedural constraints,
agencies naturally incline toward the efficiency and autonomy of informal
decision making. Most gravitate toward informal rulemaking in particular,
since agencies can evade the need to adjudicate individual cases through the
development of generally applicable rules.26 Courts have historically de-
ferred to agencies' preferences in this regard. They permit broad discretion
in the choice between rulemaking and adjudication,27 allow the use of rules
to preclude case-by-case adjudication, 28 and only require formal procedures
in rare, well-defined circumstances . 9 The predominance of informal rule-
making dictates that presidential involvement usually takes place against
this decision-making backdrop.
While courts have historically deferred to agencies' preference for in-
formal rulemaking, they have nevertheless expanded on the APA-specified
procedures for informal rulemaking to provide more elaborate requirements
19. Id. at 20-29.
20. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT BY FUNCTION:
DECEMBER 2006 (2006), http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/06fedfun.pdf.
21. BREYER ET AL., supra note 15, at 494, 520.
22. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2006).
23. Id. §§ 553-54, 556-57.
24. Id. §§ 556-57.
25. The APA requires a simple notice-and-comment procedure for prospective informal rules
and a "concise general statement" for final informal rules. Id. § 553.
26. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 15, at 494, 520.
27. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
28. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 39-45 (1964) (holding that adversarial
hearings are not required on a case-by-case basis when the precise policy issue has been addressed
through informal rulemaking).
29. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 234 (1973) (explaining that agen-
cies are only obliged to use formal procedures when the authorizing statute requires them to make
decisions "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing").
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and, consequently, a more coherent framework for presidential involvement.
By the terms of section 553 of the APA, agencies need only provide inter-
ested parties with notice and an opportunity to comment on their proposed
rules and issue "concise general statement[s]" of the reasons motivating
their final rules.30 There is no explicit requirement that they provide rational
explanations or keep anything resembling a traditional record. Beginning in
the 1970s, however, courts used aggressive statutory interpretation to trans-
form the APA's notice-and-comment procedure into an elaborate "paper
hearing" process.3 In addition to providing notice, agencies now have to
provide all relied-upon evidence to would-be commenters." On top of pro-
viding a "concise general statement," they must address significant adverse
comments and provide rational explanations for their final rules.33 Finally,
courts must review agency decisions based on the reasons agencies pro-
vide.34 The Supreme Court resisted a lower court's call for further
constraints in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, but it sug-
gested that additional procedures might become appropriate under
"extremely compelling" circumstances. 35
The judiciary's development of paper hearing requirements also facili-
tated its application of arbitrary and capricious review and its considerable
elaboration on the meaning of that standard. By the terms of section 706 of
the APA, courts must set aside agency actions that are "arbitrary, capricious
... or otherwise not in accordance with law."36 The APA's lack of explicit
record requirements for agency decision making made this standard difficult
to implement in informal contexts before the advent of paper hearings.
However, as courts began to apply section 553 more aggressively, they
viewed section 706 in a similar light. In a string of landmark decisions, the
Supreme Court interpreted section 706 to require that agencies base their
decisions on "relevant factors, 37 refrain from considering nonrelevant fac-
tors,3" and give each relevant factor its appropriate weight in the decision-
making process.39 For the purpose of arbitrary and capricious review,
30. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
31. BREYER ET AL., supra note 15, at 536. The judiciary's aggressive development of paper
hearing requirements reflected the shift from an "expertise" model to an "interest group representa-
tion" model of agency action. See Bressman, supra note 1, at 473-74; see also infra Section I.B.2.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir.
1977) (requiring disclosure of scientific data).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 245.
35. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978);
see also Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 1980).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
37. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
38. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
39. Id. ("Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
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relevance is judged by reference to statutory language: a factor is relevant if
Congress intended the agency to consider it in the decision-making process
and irrelevant if not.4° Courts generally review agencies' decisions based on
the materials they provide,4' but evidence of nonrelevant considerations can
42lead them to demand additional information.
B. The Rise and Expansion of Presidential Involvement
The administrative state has undergone many changes since its initial
emergence: as legal and political moods have shifted, so too have the institu-
tional dynamics of the administrative state. Scholars typically talk about this
evolution in terms of discrete administrative models. Each model responded
to the unique legal and political concerns of its day, stemmed logically from
the previous models, and came about through the actions of courts and other
government actors.4 ' This Section puts presidential involvement in this insti-
tutional context-as a phenomenon best explained by the succession of
several administrative models culminating in the current "presidential con-
trol" model-and then traces its expansion since the 1980s.
1. Historical Models of the Administrative State
Courts and other government actors originally conceived of the adminis-
trative state in response to the separation-of-powers concerns that attended
its emergence." The Constitution vests lawmaking power in Congress, ex-
ecutive authority in the president, and adjudicative power in a Supreme
Court.4 5 It says nothing about administrative agencies, however, and this
lack of textual support casts agencies' operations in a suspicious hue-as a
threat to the tripartite rule of law the Constitution anticipates.
The first model of the administrative state, the "transmission belt"
model, aimed to address these concerns by characterizing agencies as the
mindless executors of congressional will. Congress passed clear statutes,
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise."). In State Farm, the petitioners challenged the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's ("NHTSA") attempted rescission of existing passive-restraint regula-
tions. The majority opinion seemed to be saying that the NHTSA had not given one relevant factor
its proper weight: while the agency had clearly considered the benefits of existing passive-restraint
regulations, it did not give the factor sufficient weight in determining that there was "'substantial
uncertainty' that the regulation [would] accomplish its intended purpose." See id. at 51-52.
40. See id.
41. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
42. See Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth Anni-
versary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park's Requirement of
Judicial Review "On the Record", 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 239 (1996).
43. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 1, at 462-78; Kagan, supra note 2, at 2255-72.
44. Bressman, supra note I, at 470; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Ad-
ministrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1672-76 (1975).
45. U.S. CoNsT. arts. I, H, II.
46. See Stewart, supra note 44, at 1672-76.
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according to the model, and agencies carried out their unambiguous direc-
tives.41 Courts played along by declining to question agencies too heavily.
48
But as agencies' independent discretion became clear, the transmission belt
model lost credibility.
49
The second, "expertise" model presented a temporary fix by characteriz-
ing agency bureaucrats as specialized professionals. ° It was now clear that
agencies exercised independent discretion.5 However, courts and legislators
urged that it was acceptable for agencies to do so because they were unique-
ly qualified and because they were isolated from the political pressures that
might dissuade them from wielding their discretion objectively. 2 Congress
could not accumulate the expertise necessary to legislate unambiguously in
every realm of life, the argument ran, and so it delegated the responsibility
for elucidation-gap-filling authority-on those with the requisite knowl-
edge and training.53 This model sufficed during the New Deal and lasted
through the middle of the twentieth century.14 Yet it began to break down as
the public's distrust of government reached new heights in the 1960s and
1970s.-" The guise of expertise was sufficient insofar as agency decision
56
making involved the application of objective, technical know-how. But
agencies handled routine matters too, and their insulation was imperfect;
they had political biases and subjective opinions just like their congressional
57
appointers. The only difference was that members of Congress were
elected for theirs, and their decision making seemed more legitimate as a
result.
As the administrative state underwent further revision during the 1970s,
a curious shift occurred. The transmission belt and expertise models had
aimed to ameliorate arbitrariness concerns by showing that administrative
gap filling was different from legislating or adjudicating. 8 But their succes-
sor-the "interest group representation" ("IGR") model-sought to
legitimate agencies by making them politically accountable.59 The IGR
movement was largely driven by courts; they developed the requirements of
paper hearings and arbitrary and capricious review with an eye toward
47. Id. at 1675.
48. Id. at 1674-76.
49. Bressman, supra note 1, at 471; Stewart, supra note 44, at 1676-78.
50. See Bressman, supra note l, at 471-72; Stewart, supra note 44, at 1677-78.
51. Bressman, supra note 1, at 471-72; Stewart, supra note 44, at 1677-78.
52. See Bressman, supra note 1, at 471-72; Stewart, supra note 44, at 1677-78.
53. See Bressman, supra note 1, at 471-72; Stewart, supra note 44, at 1677-78.
54. Bressman, supra note 1, at 474-75.
55. Id.
56. See id.; Stewart, supra note 44, at 1678.
57. See Bressman, supra note 1, at 472; Stewart, supra note 44, at 1678-79.
58. Stewart, supra note 44, at 1672-75.
59. Bressman, supra note 1, at 475-78.
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accountability.60 It conceived of agency decision making (and informal
rulemaking in particular) as a miniaturized political process. The new court-
imposed requirements aimed to ensure that all interested parties could
meaningfully participate in this process-that they were involved in notice
and comment and that agencies would be made to consider their input in a
cognizable way.6' While IGR did not directly address the earlier models'
arbitrariness concerns, the clear implication was that accountability would
62itself suffice to check agency discretion. Yet some groups still seemed
more powerful than others under the IGR model,63 and many believed that
the most powerful and well-represented parties could "capture" agency de-
cisions. 64 As these fears of agency capture accelerated and the model's costs
61
were seen to outweigh its benefits, IGR lost its legitimacy.
The current "presidential control" model targets the shortcomings of
IGR while maintaining its emphasis on accountability and its failure to ac-
count for arbitrariness. From this perspective, the president is justified in
taking a personal, heavy-handed role in the management of administrative
decision making. By rendering agencies' decisions dependent on the presi-
dent's approval, it is assumed, we can make them accountable to a national
electorate by proxy.66 This tempers the problem of agency capture insofar as
the president is compelled to address and reflect majority opinions and to
61formulate his administrative agenda in line with them. It also addresses the
inefficiency of paper hearings if we can assume that the president, as a sin-
gle authoritative figure, is more capable of facilitating notice and comment
than a many-headed agency.6' The presidential control model came about as
presidents, taking advantage of the IGR model's failure and changing public
perceptions, became more actively involved in agency decision making. 69 It
has expanded rapidly since the 1980s, and because it maintains the IGR
model's emphasis on accountability, its expansion signals that the problem
of agency arbitrariness has received scant attention of late.7
60. Id. at 476-77.
61. Id.
62. Cf id. at 469 ("[T]he concern for arbitrariness became the recessive theme and the con-
cern for accountability became the dominant one.").
63. Id. at 485.
64. Id.; Croley, supra note 2, at 834.
65. See Bressman, supra note I, at 485.
66. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 2331-32.
67. Id. at 2335.
68. Id. at 2332-33.
69. See generally Strauss, supra note 3.
70. See Bressman, supra note 1, at 463-64 ("The presidential control model misleads us into
thinking that accountability is all we need to assure ourselves that agency action is constitutionally
valid.").
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2. The Expansion of Presidential Involvement
The Constitution provides no express basis for presidential involvement
in agency decision making, and presidents refrained from such involvement
before the advent of the presidential control model.7' Together, the
Appointments and Opinions Clauses give the president sole authority to ap-
point "officers of the United States" and to solicit their opinions on matters
of law. 72 The Take Care Clause73 saddles the president with a more general
and expansive duty to manage and coordinate the various executive agen-
cies.74 But the Constitution contains no explicit authorization for the
president to direct agency decision making. It draws no lines between pro-
cedural oversight and substantive guidance and declines to say how much
involvement is too much." In the face of this constitutional silence, early
presidents were deferential to agency decision making and took care not to
76
appear interested or involved in individual case outcomes. Congress overt-
ly encouraged this stance.
77
President Nixon began the sustained trend toward increased presidential
involvement. 7' Nixon formed the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") from the existing Bureau of the Budget and directed it to perform
"Quality of Life" review-which involved circulating proposed rules within
the executive branch for comment and criticism-for select classes of agen-
cy regulations.79 Presidents Ford and Carter built on Nixon's precedent by
requiring agencies to submit "major" rules to a Council on Wage-Price Sta-
bility and a Regulatory Analysis Review Group.8° These measures did not
impose legal constraints on agency action, but they signaled a break from
the past and inspired future presidents to make further encroachments into
81
agencies' autonomy.
President Reagan expanded these inroads at the beginning of the 1980s,
just as scholars were decrying the bankruptcy of the IGR model and a re-
vival of majoritarian thinking had brought the president to the figurative
71. See generally Kagan, supra note 2, at 2272-74.
72. U.S. CONST. art. fI, § 2, cls. 1-2. The president may also remove appointed officers,
subject to the minor limitations prescribed by Morrison v. Olson. See Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S.
654, 669 (1988) (inquiring as to whether the Ethics in Government Act "interfere[d]" with the presi-
dent's "take care" authority).
73. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
74. Stack, supra note 5, at 270-73. The president is typically only involved in the decision
making of executive agencies, as opposed to independent agencies, but the expansion of the presi-
dential control model has given him additional control over independent agencies of late. See infra
note 89 and accompanying text.
75. See Stack, supra note 5, at 270-73.
76. Kagan, supra note 2, at 2277.
77. Id. at 2274-76.
78. Id. at 2276.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2276-77.
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center of the American polity. A momentous executive order required
agencies to submit major rules to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs ("OIRA"), an office within the OMB, for prepublication review." It
also required agencies to accompany their submissions with "regulatory
impact analyses" and cost-benefit analyses "to the extent permitted by
law. '' Though disclaiming such authority, this order gave the president sub-
stantive control over agency decisions: OIRA had authority to determine the
adequacy of the required analyses and to prevent a rule's publication indefi-
nitely." A later executive order built on this framework by requiring
agencies to submit "annual regulatory plan[s]" for the upcoming year,86 giv-
ing OIRA even earlier opportunities to influence agency rulemaking.
While President George H. W. Bush largely followed Reagan's example,
Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush increased the intrusiveness of presi-
dential involvement significantly. A Clinton executive order scaled back
some of the Reagan orders' breadth by requiring that OMB review take
place during a specified window of time, broadening the number of factors
that agencies could consider in their mandatory cost-benefit analyses, and
requiring OIRA to disclose its communications with the agency in question
87
and persons outside the executive branch. But this order also delved into
new territory by requiring executive agencies to designate Regulatory Policy
Officers ("RPOs") to serve as OIRA point-people8 and by placing inde-
pendent agencies under OIRA's umbrella. 9 Even more importantly, it
stipulated that the president would resolve agency-OMB disputes "to the
extent permitted by law."9 Clinton expanded on the implications of these
new requirements by directing agencies on how to take action in individual
case settings and publicly taking credit for rulemaking outcomes. 9'
President George W. Bush increased the level of presidential involve-
ment even further. He repeatedly asserted case-level authority by usingS 92
signing statements to contest statutes delegating authority to agencies. He
also issued an executive order requiring that agency RPOs must be
82. See Bressman, supra note 1, at 485-86.
83. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), re-
voked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.ER. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2006); Kagan, supra note 2, at 2278.
84. Kagan, supra note 2, at 2278 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. at 128 (1982)).
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1988), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638).
87. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638; Kagan, supra note 2, at 2285-87.
88. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638.
89. Kagan, supra note 2, at 2288-90.
90. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. at 648).
91. Id. at 2290; Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Cm.-KENT. L. REV. 965
(1997).
92. Strauss, supra note 3, at 701-02, 720 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R.191
(2008)).
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presidential appointees and that "unless specifically authorized by the head
of the agency," no rulemaking may commence without RPO consent.93 Un-
der this scheme, an RPO need not report to an agency head and may not
even have to be Senate-confirmed.94
II. THE CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE OF PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT AND
THE INADEQUACY OF PREVIOUSLY ADVOCATED SOLUTIONS
As the president has become increasingly involved in agency decision
making, the scholarly debate about presidential involvement has come to
focus on two broad but well-defined critiques: one targeting accountability
and the other targeting arbitrariness. This debate has provided useful clarifi-
cation of the problems attending presidential involvement. However, it has
not yet suggested any compelling means of resolving them. This Part out-
lines the terms of the contemporary debate with an emphasis on the
inadequacies of previously articulated solutions. Sections II.A and II.B out-
line the accountability and arbitrariness critiques of presidential
involvement. Section II.C discusses the previously articulated solutions to
these critiques and argues that each is inadequate to address the problems
they raise.
A. The Accountability Critique of Presidential Involvement
According to the accountability critique, contemporary presidential in-
volvement makes agencies less accountable to the public in their decision
making. 5 As Part I explained, the presidential control model justifies intense
presidential involvement by its supposed tendency to make agencies ac-
96
countable to the president and, by proxy, to his national electorate. Agency
discretion is assumed acceptable so long as the public can see it and keep it
in check, and the president, as a singularly visible and responsive actor, is
thought to enable this process.97 The accountability critique of presidential
control posits the exact opposite-that agencies hide behind a veil of presi-
dential privilege, that the president hides behind a bureaucratic web, and
that both entities are less accountable to the public as a result.9 There is
considerable evidence that this theory is borne out in reality.9
93. Id. at 701-02 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 78-84 (2006).
96. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
97. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 2331-32.
98. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 78-79.
99. See id. But see Croley, supra note 2; Sally Katzen, Correspondence, A Reality Check on
an Empirical Study: Comments on "Inside the Administrative State", 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497,
1502-06 (2007).
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Presidents since Reagan have taken bold steps to make presidential in-
volvement more variable and less transparent, and the judiciary has done
little to counter them.' °° The above-referenced executive orders have ex-
panded presidential authority and White House bureaucracy.'' The
expansion of presidential authority provides new means for presidential in-
volvement, such as letter directives and signing statements.' °2 The expansion
of White House bureaucracy means that presidential involvement now issues
through a number of White House offices in addition to issuing from OIRA
or the president himself.'°3 Different offices represent "the president" using
different measures and routes, and this renders agency decision making
more variable by increasing the range of outcomes that presidential in-
volvement can theoretically promote.'00 The range of "presidential" actors
also makes agency decision making less transparent because it prevents the
public from immediately discerning whether the president, one of his subor-
dinate offices, or the agency in question is primarily responsible for any
given decision. 0 5 Since presidential involvement is not always included in
the agency's or the president's record, moreover, the public cannot easily
trace its occurrence after the fact. '°6
The variability and nontransparency of agency decision making leads di-
rectly to a decrease in agencies' political accountability. Because
presidential involvement is in fact exercised by a multitude of semi-
autonomous White House entities, agencies are not always accountable to
the president himself.'0 7 Because the public can neither see nor understand
the rules of presidential involvement, it is unsure whether to hold the presi-
dent, an agency, or some combination of the two accountable for any
decision-making outcome.' And the likely result of all this-that the public
will give the president credit when he claims it and blame agencies when
100. For a recounting of presidents' past efforts in this regard, see supra Section I.B.2. Courts,
meanwhile, have traditionally given the president a wide berth in connection with his efforts to
influence agency decision making, declining to set the bounds of acceptable involvement. See, e.g.,
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Where the President himself is directly
involved in oral communications with Executive Branch officials, Article II considerations-
combined with the strictures of Vermont Yankee-require that courts tread with extraordinary cau-
tion in mandating disclosure beyond that already required by statute.").
101. For an explanation of the expansion of presidential authority, see supra Section I.B.2.
The expansion of White House bureaucracy is explained in Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note
95.
102. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 701-02, 720; Strauss, supra note 91, at 965-66.
103. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 66-67.
104. See id. at 93-94.
105. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Correspondence, Legitimacy, Selec-
tivity and the Disunitary Executive: A Reply to Sally Katzen, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1519-22
(2007); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 45 1,
464-65 (1979).
106. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 81.
107. Id. at 93-94.
108. See Strauss, supra note 91, at 965-67,984.
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not-is hardly reminiscent of the political-process accountability that theI 09
presidential control model envisions.
The nonaccountability of agency decision making also has direct nega-
tive implications for the efficiency and fairness of agency rulemaking.
Without a clear, rule-driven procedure for involvement, today's bureaucra-
tized executive looks little like the unitary executive of theory, and
presidential involvement is more likely to impede than to expedite agency
decision making." ° In the absence of public scrutiny, moreover, the presi-
dent and his agencies have few incentives to follow majority opinion or to
resist factious viewpoints. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that they
do not."'
B. The Arbitrariness Critique of Presidential Involvement
According to the arbitrariness critique, presidential involvement in-
creases agencies' discretion and allows them to ignore their statutory criteria
for decision making. As Part I explained, the presidential control model
aims to assuage the accountability-based shortcomings of interest groupS 112
representation. But it remains vulnerable to the same arbitrariness prob-
lems that the transmission belt and expertise models grappled with and the
IGR model largely ignored." 3 The presidential control model implicitly dis-
penses with these problems by assuming: (a) that presidential involvement
provides substantive law for agencies to follow, i.e., that it is less arbitrary
for the president to exercise "gap-filling" authority than it is for agencies to
114do so; or (b) that presidential involvement will ensure agencies' compli-
ance with congressional intent, i.e., that the president is willing and able to
oil the "transmission belt."" 5 Yet presidential gap filling is inherently more
109. Cf id. at 984 ("While, from a political perspective, one can applaud a President who
goes out of his way to take responsibility as well as credit for the policy judgments of his admini-
stration, this seems a high price to pay.").
110. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 93 ("The multiplicity of voices through
which presidential control speaks inhibits it from speaking authoritatively or effectively.").
Ill. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,
106 COLuM. L. REV. 1260 (2006) (arguing that presidential involvement is systematically biased in
favor of antiregulatory interests); Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 86 ("EPA respondents
indicated that the White House is more likely [than the EPA itself] to be captured by an interest
group.").
112. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
114. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 2336-37 (commenting on the president's "comparative ad-
vantage" over agencies); Strauss, supra note 91, at 981 ("We have not doubted that executive
officials can be lawmakers, in the strongest sense, at least since 1905 ....").
115. See Croley, supra note 2, at 861 (noting that the White House did not measurably exert
more pressure for some interests than for others); Kagan, supra note 2, at 2361.
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arbitrary than agency gap filling,"6 and the president lacks the institutional
ability and motivation to make agencies follow congressional commands." 7
The president's gap filling is inherently more arbitrary than an agency's
because he has fewer institutional constraints. From a constitutional stand-
point, the president and his agencies are equally constrained: neither has the
ability to make law,"8 and while Congress may delegate gap-filling authority
to either entity, the same "intelligible principle" criterion guides both forms
of delegation." 9 However, from another perspective, the president is signifi-
cantly less constrained. The past century of administrative practice has
yielded a high number of judicial and statutory standards for agency gap
filling.' 2 These standards ensure that agency gap-filling processes resemble
congressional lawmaking processes and that arbitrariness concerns are miti-
gated: the notice-and-comment process, like congressional lawmaking, is
deliberative, is designed to protect minority concerns, and makes it rela-
tively difficult for agencies to institute and overturn rules.' 2' Notice-and-
comment rulemaking also generates a more-or-less coherent record for judi-
cial review.12 The president's decision-making processes, by contrast, are
more efficient than deliberative, are not designed to protect minority con-
cerns, and are conducive to decisions that are relatively easy for the
president to institute and overturn."' They are also considerably more diffi-
cult for courts to review.'
24
The president also lacks the institutional ability and motivation to make
agencies follow congressional commands, and while courts are naturally
suited to this role, the president's involvement prevents them from perform-
ing it. As Part I explained, the problem of administrative arbitrariness is
defined by the lack of clear statutory commands and the ability of
116. See Yvette M. Barksdale, The Presidency and Administrative Value Selection, 42 Am. U.
L. REV. 273, 309-26 (1993); Bressman, supra note 1, at 524-25; Stack, supra note 5, at 317-18.
117. See Barksdale, supra note 116, at 309-26.
118. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
119. Under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress may not delegate its legislative authority to
outside entities. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 15, at 36-40. It may delegate "quasi-legislative"
authority, however, and the bounds between these types of authority are defined by the presence or
absence of "intelligible principles" that limit the delegate's discretion according to Congress's will
(thus preserving the fiction that Congress has "legislated"). See id. The "intelligible principle" stan-
dard is the same whether Congress delegates authority to the president, an agency, some other entity,
or some combination of entities. Compare Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F Supp. 737
(D.D.C. 1971) (approving a delegation from Congress to the president upon finding "intelligible
principles"), with Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (approving a
Congress-to-agency delegation on the same basis). But see Kagan, supra note 2, at 2369.
120. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
121. See Barksdale, supra note 116, at 309-26. If an agency seeks to revoke its own rules, it
must dispense with the considerations on which it relied to recommend the rules in the first instance.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
122. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text (outlining the extensive procedures asso-
ciated with paper hearings and arbitrary and capricious review).
123. See Barksdale, supra note 116, at 309-26.
124. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 82-93.
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administrative actors to circumvent them. 2 Presidential involvement is
bound to aggravate this problem because the president's institutional moti-
vations stem from the public's contemporary wants and needs, and because
he is likely to act on them-regardless of their compliance with the delegat-
ing statute-to conserve political capital. '26 Even if the president were
inclined to uphold statutory intent, his political incentives and lack of inter-
pretive expertise would likely bias his efforts. 2 7 And his involvement in
administrative decision making positively impedes courts from upholding
statutory intent themselves. Given its legal training and relative isolation
from the political process, the judiciary is uniquely positioned to interpret
and uphold statutory intent.'28 However, because presidential involvement
renders administrative decision making less transparent and less review-
able,'29 it hinders courts from performing this role. While courts might
respond to these difficulties through tougher standards of review or adher-
ence to existing standards, 30 their currently deferential position has had the
opposite result-that of leaving the arbitrariness problems of presidential
involvement unchecked. 
3
'
C. The Inadequacy of Previously Suggested Solutions
The contemporary debate has usefully corralled the problems of presi-
dential involvement under the headings of "accountability" and
"arbitrariness." However, as this Section demonstrates, the debate has not
yet identified a workable solution to these problems. Instead, while attempt-
ing to impose meaningful limits on presidential involvement, scholars have
missed the mark by either addressing one critique at the expense of the other
or by failing in terms of precision and practicality.
Elena Kagan initiated the modem debate about presidential involvement,
in effect, with her 2001 article Presidential Administration. 2Writing before
today's accountability and arbitrariness critiques had fully crystallized, Ka-
gan largely accepted the assumptions of the presidential control model 3' and
sought to maximize agencies' accountability by increasing their visibility to
the president's national electorate."3 She thus left crucial aspects of the
125. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
126. The president is theoretically motivated by his national electorate, whose interests may
or may not correspond with those represented by the current statutory framework. See Kagan, supra
note 2, at 2335.
127. See Bressman, supra note 1, at 506.
128. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
129. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 82.
130. And that is precisely what this Note recommends. See infra Section M.A.
131. See infra Section l1l.B; supra note 100 and accompanying text.
132. Kagan, supra note 2.
133. See Bressman, supra note 1, at 503.
134. Kagan, supra note 2, at 2363-85.
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arbitrariness critique unaddressed,'3 5 and her efforts to improve accountabil-
ity also proved impractical in retrospect. To increase agencies' and the
president's accountability, Kagan suggested that courts should hinge Chev-
ron deference on evidence of presidential involvement'36: that they should
only allow deference where the president is involved in the decision under
review. 37 Kagan astutely predicted that the prospect of losing Chevron def-
erence would give agencies and presidents an incentive to highlight the
channels and means of presidential involvement, increasing their account-
ability to courts and the public as such.'
However, Kagan surely exaggerated the strength of this incentive. After
all, a denial of Chevron deference is not the same as a reversal, ' and a
president involved in controversial decisions might take the risk of affirma-
tion sans Chevron before exposing his involvement. Kagan also overstated
the degree to which highlighting involvement is akin to promoting account-
ability. In her scheme, the president need only signal his involvement to
obtain Chevron deference. '4° However, as the above discussion has shown,
the president has a plethora of smoke-screening tactics to make the details
135. Bressman, supra note 1, at 503-04.
136. Chevron requires courts to conduct a two-step inquiry when reviewing agency interpreta-
tions of law. First, the court must determine whether the agency-interpreted language is "clear" or
not. If the court determines that the language is clear, then its subsequent review consists of deter-
mining whether the agency's interpretation comports with this clear meaning and overturning the
agency's interpretation if it does not. If the court determines that the language is not clear, then it
determines whether the agency's interpretation is "reasonable" and overturns the agency's interpre-
tation if it is not. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
Subsequent decisions have also added a "step zero" to the Chevron inquiry by requiring courts to
ask whether particular forms of agency interpretation are ever eligible for Chevron deference. See
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
137. Kagan, supra note 2, at 2380.
138. Id. at 2372 (explaining how courts should coax the president into transparency).
139. Chevron deference only entitles an agency to escape judicial second-guessing when
Congress has not clearly spoken on the correct interpretation of a law and the agency presents a
reasonable alternative. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. If Chevron deference were denied, as in the
above hypothetical, the reviewing court would make an independent legal interpretation and weigh
the agency's against its own. See id. at 845. The agency might still receive a lesser form of interpre-
tive deference. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating, forty years prior to
Chevron, that judicial deference should "depend upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency's]
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control"); Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (explaining that when Chevron deference is inapplicable,
certain agency decisions are still "entitled to respect" under Skidnore).
140. Kagan, supra note 2, at 2380. Kagan does not specify how the president should signal his
involvement or how the courts should go about discerning it. She hints, though, at the difficulties
that the president and judiciary would face in administering her solution:
The President and his immediate staff cannot offer input, much less direction, on all or even
most interpretations of law reached by executive departments. Conversely, the President and
his staff might participate extensively in the occasional legal interpretation offered by an inde-
pendent commission. Given these realities, courts could apply Chevron when, but only when,
presidential involvement rises to a certain level of substantiality, as manifested in executive
orders and directives, mlemaking records, and other objective indicia of decisionmaking proc-
esses.
Id. at 2377.
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of his involvement unclear.14' This is problematic because agencies remain
unaccountable so long as we cannot see how or why they made the deci-
sions they did. 4 The president can claim credit or not, regardless of his
actual input.14 And while agencies might themselves have incentives to re-
veal the details of involvement, they are not always aware of the channels
and means through which the president is involved.'"
As the author of the modem arbitrariness critique, Lisa Bressman took
aim at Kagan's emphasis on accountability while suggesting new ways to
address the problem of arbitrariness. 45 In her 2003 article Beyond Account-
ability, Bressman suggested that the best solution to the arbitrariness
critique was for agencies to elaborate their own decision-making criteria on
top of those provided by Congress. 46 According to her, the creation of these
additional constraints would limit agency discretion both in law and in fact
by clarifying the bounds of appropriate agency behavior and helping courts
to discern them.
47
Yet Bressman's solution to the arbitrariness critique is insufficient. It ig-
nores the fact that agencies, like the president, are an improper substitute for
Congress.14 While agencies are categorically better than the president at
statutory gap filling, 49 Congress retains sole authority to make positive law
in all instances. 50 Bressman's approach ignores this fact by letting agencies
define their own "intelligible principles" when the existence of such princi-
ples is a prerequisite for agency action. 1' It is also impractical: first, because
the Supreme Court has effectively vetoed it;"' and second, because it does
not suggest a means by which courts should monitor presidential involve-
ment in agency-created regimes. This is problematic because the president is
141. See supra Section II.A. The above discussion dealt with the confusion caused involuntar-
ily by the variability and nontransparency of presidential involvement. But the president could easily
use this confusion to his advantage if he wanted to make the details of his involvement unclear. See
also Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 69.
142. In this respect, recall the reasoning behind arbitrary and capricious review-that the form
of deliberation matters in addition to its results (i.e. that relevant factors are the only ones that agen-
cies may consider). See supra notes 37-42.
143. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
144. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 93 ("[T]he agency has difficulty assessing
and following administration policy.").
145. Bressman, supra note 1.
146. Id. at 532-33.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
149. See Barksdale, supra note 116, at 306-07; see also supra notes 120-124 and accompany-
ing text.
150. Barksdale, supra note 116, at 304.
151. See supra noteI 19.
152. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (preventing an agency
from providing its own "intelligible principle" and clarifying that "the [agency's] prescription of the
standard that Congress had omitted .. . would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative au-
thority").
[Vol. 107:643
Irrelevant Oversight
likely to shape agency-created standards'53 and because the arbitrariness of
agency decision making is largely due to the nature of presidential involve-
ment, rather than the lack of decision-making criteria.
5 4
Writing in 2006, Kevin Stack addressed the arbitrariness critique of
presidential involvement' with partially satisfying results. Stack discredited
the unitary-executive-based theory that, to be constitutional, the directive
authority contained in Congress-to-agency delegations must "run" to the
president, allowing him to stand in for the agency.'5 6 As Stack showed, the
Constitution permits Congress to delegate directive power to nonpresidential
entities such as agencies.'5 7 In practice, moreover, Congress only intends to
give the president directive authority in a limited number of cases, i.e., those
where it explicitly delegates directive authority to him.58 Based on this
showing, Stack concluded that the president's case-level directives were
only legally binding in these limited instances, and that, as a formal matter,
presidential involvement should impose fewer constraints on agency deci-
sion making than is commonly supposed.' 59
Like Bressman, however, Stack failed to elucidate how courts, Congress,
or both should proceed with the task of loosening these constraints and re-
versing modem trends." ° By assuming that his assertion of illegality was
enough, Stack exaggerated the ability and incentives of agencies to resist
presidential involvement. The president has plentiful means of levying pres-
. 161
sure on agencies, and he appoints agency heads that he believes will
yield. 62 An outside adjudicator is intuitively necessary to enable agency re-
sistance and curb the impact of presidential involvement.
More recently, Michele Gilman suggested that courts should use the fa-
mous typology from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer to evaluate
153. This follows directly from the fact that modem presidents are heavily involved in agency
decision making.
154. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 76-78.
155. Stack, supra note 5.
156. For an overview of the unitary-executive theory, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
135 (1926) ("[Tlhe President ... may properly supervise and guide [executive officers'] construc-
tion of the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the
laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power
in the President alone."). For a summary of the theory that agency authority "runs" to the president,
see Stack, supra note 5, at 266 ("[Dlefenders of a strongly 'unitary' executive argue that the Consti-
tution requires that all executive power be vested in the President, and therefore that any agency
action should be subject to presidential revision.").
157. See Stack, supra note 5, at 296-304.
158. Id.at278-81.
159. See id. at 313-16.
160. Stack suggests that courts should ask whether authority runs to the president in each case
and then apply or withhold Chevron deference accordingly. Id. at 293. Yet, like Kagan, he fails to
inquire about the content of presidential involvement, which may still render an agency's decision
arbitrary and capricious even if Chevron's criteria are satisfied. See infra Section H.A.
161. See supra Section I.B.2.
162. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 736.
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instances of presidential involvement. 63 Gilman's 2007 article built on
Stack's basic insight-that Congress-to-agency delegations do not always
give the president directive authority-and it articulated a host of follow-up
questions, based on Youngstown, to ask when congressional delegations do
not provide the president with directive authority. Among the most pressing
of these questions are the following:
1. Does the president have outside statutory authority?' 64
2. Has Congress expressly prohibited the president from exercising the au-
thority in question?1
6
1
3. Are there explicit or implicit constitutional concerns for or against the
president's exercise of authority?1
66
This framework presents a coherent and time-tested means of reviewing
presidential involvement, and I anticipate that it should be used in conjunc-
tion with my Part IV recommendations. 67 However, its weaknesses should
still prevent it from being the predominant check on presidential involve-
ment. Recent Supreme Court opinions show an increased willingness to read
Youngstown in the president's favor. 6 Also, Youngstown leaves room for the
president to "adversely possess" authority where Congress has not explicitly
said "no.', 169 Such reliance on congressional-presidential dialogue is unreal-
istic given that Congress lacks the incentives and ability to monitor
individual instances of presidential power grabbing. 10 The president is more
163. Gilman, supra note 3, at 1133. Writing in concurrence in Youngstown, Justice Jackson
described three categories of presidential action. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). According to him, the president has the most power
when acting pursuant to Congress's express or implied intentions and the least authority when acting
against Congress's intentions (in such instances, his actions are only lawful if they are supported by
an exclusive constitutional grant). When Congress has not spoken, the president acts in a "zone of
twilight": he "can only rely upon his own independent powers," but his real authority "is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables." Id. at 637.
164. See Gilman, supra note 3, at 1128.
165. See id. at 1133.
166. See id. at 1146.
167. Gilman's approach is still clearly necessary in situations, like the ones addressed in her
article, where the president is able to devise an executive order that is "essentially self-executing"
and obviates his need to influence or commandeer agency decision making. See id. at 1144-45.
Such cases do not implicate "presidential involvement" within the meaning of this Note and do not
allow for the application of arbitrary and capricious review. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
168. Since the Court decided Youngstown, it has become decidedly more willing to view
constitutional and statutory language flexibly in favor of the president. Compare Youngstown, 343
U.S. 579 (finding that Congress implicitly forbade presidential action), with Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (finding that Congress had implicitly authorized presidential action
under conditions similar to those in Youngstown); see also Strauss, supra note 3, at 699-700.
169. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[A] systematic, unbro-
ken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned
... may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President ... .
170. Stack, supra note 5, at 320.
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capable of speedy action than Congress by design,"' and the judiciary is
better positioned to identify and curb his constitutional excesses.
Aside from being one sided and impractical, the above solutions share
another common fault: with the partial exception of Kagan's solution, they
rely primarily on nonjudicial actors to keep presidential involvement in
check. For Stack and Bressman, agencies are supposed to define and uphold
their own limits." For Gilman, Congress performs this function by pre-
empting or reacting to the president's specific exercises of authority.14 And
while Kagan instructs the courts to condition Chevron deference, she as-
sumes that agencies and the president will signal to courts how and when to
do so. 5 These and other authors have acknowledged the importance of judi-
cial review, and at least one commentator has applied arbitrary and
capricious review to a concrete instance of presidential involvement.' But
none has yet provided a comprehensive system for judicial review in all
cases of presidential involvement. Such a system is necessary because of the
difficulty of monitoring agency decision making in the face of presidential
involvement, 8 the judiciary's current reluctance to review agency decision
making in instances of presidential involvement, 1 and the judiciary's
unique ability to monitor and limit presidential involvement.8
III. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW AS A MEANS OF LIMITING
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
Arbitrary and capricious review presents courts with a workable but un-
explored means of limiting presidential involvement and of accomplishing
what previously suggested solutions have not: a coherent response to the
accountability and arbitrariness critiques. This Part undertakes to outline
how courts should apply arbitrary and capricious review more effectively to
scrutinize agency decisions in cases of presidential involvement. Section
171. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 375 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) ("Deci-
sion, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterise the proceedings of one man, in a
much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number....").
172. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
173. See supra text accompanying notes 146 and 159.
174. See Gilman, supra note 3, at 1127-28.
175. Kagan, supra note 2, at 2380.
176. See, e.g., id. (suggesting that courts should "relax" the traditional scrutiny of arbitrary
and capricious review where the president is involved in administrative decision making).
177. B.J. Sanford, Note, Midnight Regulations, Judicial Review, and the Formal Limits of
Presidential Rulemaking, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782 (2003). Sanford's note anticipates my argument in
Part m] to some degree by applying arbitrary and capricious review to a single instance of presiden-
tial involvement. Id. at 801-03. It stops short, however, of suggesting the general, bifurcated
framework that I elaborate there.
178. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 82-93.
179. See infra Section If.B; supra note 100 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 128 and 172 and accompanying text.
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III.A provides a model for the application of arbitrary and capricious review
across situations of presidential involvement. Section III.B discusses the
existing obstacles to arbitrary and capricious review and highlights the pos-
sibility of its meaningful application in light of such obstacles. Section III.C
demonstrates that arbitrary and capricious review is a better solution to the
accountability and arbitrariness critiques of presidential involvement than
those suggested in the existing literature.
A. A Model for the Application ofArbitrary and Capricious Review
in Situations of Presidential Involvement
Arbitrary and capricious review provides courts with a straightforward
system for reviewing agency decisions that are subject to presidential in-
volvement. In such cases, the judiciary should first determine whether
Congress delegated directive authority to the agency or to the president. The
catalogue of "relevant factors" and the course of review should depend on
the holder of directive authority. And while the level of scrutiny should be
stringent in both instances, it should be more stringent where the agency,
rather than the president, is the holder of authority.
In reviewing a decision that has been subject to presidential involve-
ment, the court should first use ordinary principles of statutory interpretation
to determine whether the agency or president holds directive authority. As
the above discussion has shown, despite courts' demonstrated propensity to
allow aggressive presidential involvement, Congress does not typically in-
tend for the president to have directive authority. s8 The agency is the
presumptive holder of directive authority, and this presumption is only over-
come when Congress explicitly says otherwise. This convention draws
support both from constitutional considerations"' and from other areas ofthe law. 83
1. Where the Agency Holds Directive Authority
The court should base its relevant-factor inquiry on the identity of the
authority holder, and the course of this inquiry should be particularly strin-
gent where the agency, rather than the president, holds directive authority. A
Congress-to-agency delegation implies that the president's directives are
nonbinding-that the agency need not heed them in making its decisions.
' 84
But on top of that, it dictates that the agency must not heed such directives.
And indeed, the president must refrain from even expressing case-level
181. See Stack, supra note 5, at 276-99.
182. See id.
183. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989
DuKE L.J. 511 (explaining that Chevron proceeds from an assumption that Congress meant to grant
agencies interpretive authority in cases where it used ambiguous language).
184. Stack, supra note 5, at 313-14.
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opinions because Congress-to-agency delegations imply that the president's
case-level opinions are themselves irrelevant factors.'
The president's case-level opinions are irrelevant because when Con-
gress delegates to an agency, it aims to benefit from that agency's unique
institutional advantages-to address a set of problems with expert, nonpoli-
tical decision making. 1 6 But presidential opinions prevent agencies from
using these advantages. Even when the president bases his case-level opin-
ion on relevant factors, he substitutes his own judgment for the agency's,
weighing the relevant factors himself. This is problematic because Congress
has indicated that the agency is uniquely capable of rendering judgment,
which necessarily means the opinions of outside people or entities are ir-
relevant and must not receive consideration. 8 7 Since the agency is unduly
likely to incorporate all or part of the president's opinion into its own,""
courts must assume the agency has considered this irrelevant factor if it is
present. If the president expresses case-level opinions in a context of agency
authority, then the agency's decision is inherently arbitrary and capricious. s9
The irrelevance of the president's case-level opinions requires reviewing
courts to conduct a searching review to identify the expression of any such
opinions. It is not enough for courts to flag explicit presidential directives.
Rather, since presidential involvement takes place on a multitude of institu-
tional and psychological levels,' 90 courts must also search for more nuanced
expressions of case-level opinion. Direct communications between the
president and the agency are the most obvious place where such opinions
could appear, and courts should take great care to include them in the record
for review, regardless of whether the agency has included them in its
185. See supra notes 37-42, 181-183 and accompanying text; infra notes 227-231 and ac-
companying text.
186. See infra notes 227-231 and accompanying text. Although Part I noted the flaws of the
"expertise" model, that discussion should not be read to debunk the instant proposition that agencies
are expert decision makers in design and in fact. See infra, notes 227-231 and accompanying text.
The "expertise" model merely exaggerated the benefits of expertise--objectivity and technical
know-how--to obscure the problem of arbitrariness. See supra Section l.B. 1.
187. See supra note 185.
188. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
189. At first glance, this application of arbitrary and capricious review might seem to give the
president opportunities for stalling the promulgation of disfavored rules-if an agency was poised to
finalize a rule that the president disfavored, it seems, he could purposefully and visibly express an
opinion, rendering the proposed rule arbitrary and capricious. See supra text accompanying note
109. But a number of considerations urge that such stalling should not occur. First, the president has
authority to remove agency heads. See supra note 72. His primary incentive to use subtler forms of
influence is to avoid the negative publicity that attends visible removal decisions. Stack, supra note
5, at 295. But stalling is just as visible as removal once flagged by the courts, and the application of
arbitrary and capricious review curbs subtler forms of influence by increasing judicial scrutiny. See
supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text. Second, since the president appoints agency heads in
the first instance, it is likely that they will share his political convictions, so it is unlikely that he will
need (or want) to stall. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
190. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 66-67.
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decision-making record.' 9' Aside from direct communications, however, the
president's executive orders, "take care" directives, and public statements
are also inherently suspect.' 9 Courts should examine these documents for
tacit or explicit presidential expressions about pending or upcoming agency
decisions. If courts find evidence of such presidential involvement, they
should deem such opinions irrelevant and presume that the agency consid-
ered them.193
2. Where the President Holds Directive Authority
Arbitrary and capricious review should be less stringent where Congress
has delegated directive authority to the president. Yet it should still require a
more "substantial inquiry"'' 94 than courts currently apply. The first and most
important implication of a delegation that runs to the president is that the
president may direct an agency how to decide individual cases: presidential
opinion is itself a relevant factor that the agency must consider wherever it' 95
exists. Since Franklin v. Massachusetts dictates that the president is not an
agency, the court may not directly scrutinize the content of presidentialS 196
opinions for relevant-factor compliance. But the nondelegation doctrine
still urges a direct inquiry, as noted in Part 11.197 With regard to the presi-
dent's direct actions, the court must ask whether Congress provided
"intelligible principles" and whether the president abided by them in render-
ing case-level decisions. 98 Also, the court must still apply arbitrary and
capricious review to the agency's decision. Directive authority is different
from independent authority, after all, and when Congress allows the presi-
dent to direct an agency (rather than allowing him to act alone), he is still
indirectly subject to the limitations of agency action.' 99 Agency heads
191. A reviewing court should be able to determine whether such communications took place,
regardless of whether they appear on the provided record, by interviewing agency heads. Agency
heads will likely reveal any such communications in order to preserve their institutional autonomy
and to avoid perjuring themselves. The reservations expressed in note 144 and its accompanying text
are not necessarily dispositive in this regard because a reviewing court need only look for thefact of
presidential involvement; it need not discern the specific White House entity or office administering
the president's policy.
192. See supra Section 1.13.2 (explaining how presidents have used these tactics to influence
agency decisions).
193. Kagan suggests that courts should conduct a similar search for evidence of presidential
involvement. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 2377. However, while her approach instructs courts to
conduct an imprecise balancing test to determine the substantiality of presidential involvement, see
supra note 140, this Note's approach to arbitrary and capricious review instructs courts to look
solely for the fact that the president opined when the agency holds directive authority.
194. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
195. See supra notes 37-42, 181-183 and accompanying text; infra notes 227-231 and ac-
companying text.
196. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
197. See supra note 119.
198. See supra note 119.
199. See Stack, supra note 5, at 278-93.
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implement the president's directives in these contexts, and they are subject
to arbitrary and capricious review in doing so.20° As a presumptively consid-
ered factor, the president's opinion is a necessary item for inclusion on therecordfor • 20,
record for review. And if the content of presidential opinion veers from
Congress's relevance criteria (insofar as the agency has considered and ap-
plied it), then the court must overturn the agency's decision.2 °2 While the
agency must consider the president's opinion, the agency's independent
statutory constraints dictate that it cannot always legally implement it.
To ensure accountability and nonarbitrariness, arbitrary and capricious
review should still require intense scrutiny of agency decisions where the
president has directive authority. While the president's case-level opinions
are not themselves irrelevant in such cases, their agency-considered content
. 203
must not involve the weighing of irrelevant factors. And the same factors
that urge aggressive review in situations of agency authority urge it here as
well. °6 Presidential involvement is still an "extremely compelling circum-
stance., 20 5 And while the need for "executive privilege" 6 la Sierra Club v.
Costle has at least some resonance in situations of presidential authority, it
is still relatively minimal in the informal contexts where presidential in-
volvement usually occurs. 201 It should not serve to lighten the scrutiny of
arbitrary and capricious review.
B. Overcoming Obstacles to the Application ofArbitrary and Capricious
Review in Situations of Presidential Involvement
Courts have erected many obstacles to arbitrary and capricious review in
cases of presidential involvement, and my model seems admittedly imprac-
tical on first glance. However, a closer inspection reveals that these
obstacles are all either groundless or minimal enough to preserve the
200. This much is clear from the language of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
201. Cf Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406-07 (1981) (suggesting that presidential
involvement should be docketed in circumstances raising a presumption that the agency or the pres-
ident acted improperly).
202. Cf id.
203. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
204. These factors include the likelihood that the president will consider irrelevant factors, the
difficulty of tracking his involvement, and the infrequency of his intensive involvement, all of which
have been mentioned above.
205. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 543
(1978).
206. The Sierra Club court relied on United States v. Nixon in expounding the need for "ex-
ecutive privilege'" Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In Nixon, the Supreme
Court instructed that the president's ability to communicate confidentially with his staff "[was]
fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). Yet this need is clearly
reduced in situations of informal rulemaking. See infra note 216 and accompanying text. An agency
head is not as clearly a member of the president's staff as other government employees are. See infra
note 229. Also, the informal rulemaking process--designed to foster transparent, democratic par-
ticipation by interested parties-is unlike those contexts where the Supreme Court typically upholds
executive privilege. See infra notes 215-216 and accompanying text.
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opportunity for meaningful review. Arbitrary and capricious review is both
technically applicable and properly applied in all cases of presidential in-
volvement.
The first obstacle to arbitrary and capricious review comes from Frank-
lin v. Massachusetts, where the Supreme Court ruled that the president is not
an agency and that, as such, he is immune from all APA-anticipated stan-•207
dards of review, arbitrary and capricious review included. However,
Franklin does nothing to prevent courts from checking an agency's record
for presidential involvement; it merely exempts the president from direct
APA review. 2°1 It is consistent with Franklin for a court to inquire about
presidential involvement while scrutinizing an agency's decision-making
record, and this Note proposes nothing more.
A second, more significant obstacle to arbitrary and capricious review
comes from Sierra Club v. Costle, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit placed the burden on plaintiffs to prove that unrecorded presi-
dential involvement had caused the agency to consider irrelevant factors. 209
This ruling makes it difficult to apply arbitrary and capricious review in
• • 210
cases of unrecorded presidential involvement. However, Sierra Club actu-
ally supports the standard's use as a general matter-the court noted that the
decision whether or not to docket presidential involvement for relevant-
factor analysis requires a case-by-case judicial analysis .2 " Also, there is rea-
son to believe that Sierra Club's impact has eroded with time. In the twenty-
six years since the case was decided, it has garnered little judicial support.
At the same time presidential involvement has expanded considerably.1
Given the modem president's intensive and explicit involvement in agency
decision making, it is now presumably easier for plaintiffs to demonstrate
that a president has caused an agency to consider irrelevant factors. The ex-
pansion of presidential involvement also leaves fewer reasons to prioritize
executive privilege over judicial review as a baseline matter. At the time Si-
erra Club was decided, the president was just starting to become involved in
207. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
208. See id.
209. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F2d 298, 405-07 (1981). In the court's logic, "executive privi-
lege" gave the president presumptive immunity; confidential communications were more important
than the interests served by arbitrary and capricious review. Id.
210. Throughout this Note, I have asserted that presidential involvement is often unrecorded
(or at least that it is in theory). Sierra Club makes it harder to review presidential involvement be-
cause of this fact, i.e., because plaintiffs have the burden to show presidential involvement but they
presumably lack the resources or the power to determine its unrecorded substance. Yet arbitrary and
capricious review would still be useful for monitoring presidential involvement even if I am incor-
rect in my assertion that Sierra Club is outdated and/or incorrect as a matter of law. In cases where
the agency held directive authority, plaintiffs would only have to show the fact of presidential in-
volvement, i.e., the fact of involvement would itself prove consideration of irrelevant factors. See
supra notes 185-189 and accompanying text. In cases where the president held directive authority,
the plaintiffs could still rely on executive orders and other public documents to show the president's
irrelevant intent. See supra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
211. Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 406-07.
212. See supra Section I.B.2.
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administrative decision making; the dangers of presidential involvement
were as yet unknown.2 1 ' Today's public and courts are presumably more
likely to see confidentiality as an opportunity for abuse and the purposes of
arbitrary and capricious review as comparatively important.2 4 The case for
executive privilege is also relatively weak in the context of informal rule-
making, which is meant to promote careful, open deliberation. 2 5 The cases
where courts recognize executive privilege typically involve a much clearer
216
need for secrecy or expediency.
Lastly, Sierra Club is outdated because it implicitly buys into the incor-
rect presumptions that the contemporary debate has debunked. By
lightening its scrutiny, prioritizing executive privilege, and presuming that
an incomplete agency-provided record was accurate,2 7 the court misunder-
stood the president's significance for relevant-factor analysis. It implicitly
assumed (a) that unrecorded presidential input was limited to a discussion of
relevant factors addressed in the agency-provided record; or (b) that the
agency did not consider any irrelevant factors implicated by presidential
input. The discussion in Parts I and II shows the fallacy of these assump-
tions. The president's institutional interests should motivate him to provide
irrelevant input,28 and his positional authority increases the likelihood that
agencies will consider it.
219
Ultimately, insofar as Congress intends an agency delegation to foster
independent thinking and intrabranch disagreement, the president's opinion
is itself an irrelevant factor. Even if based wholly on relevant factors, the
president's opinion represents a weighing of interests that the agency was
meant to conduct;"O and an agency's expertise is less operative once tainted• 221
by the authority of presidential opinion. Together with the issues ad-
dressed in Part II, these considerations caution that greater, not less,
scrutiny is appropriate in instances of presidential involvement. While
213. See supra Section I.B.2.
214. Cf ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000) (linking a historical decline in voter turnout and trust in government to a more
general erosion of America's social networks).
215. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (describing paper-hearing procedures).
216. See Ronald L. Claveloux, Note, The Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congres-
sional Oversight: The Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1333, 1346 (explaining that executive
privilege arises in three distinct situations: those involving "military or diplomatic secrets"; those
where executive privilege is necessary to protect government informants; and those dealing with
"intra-governmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated").
217. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 404-05 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
218. See supra note 126.
219. This is true both because presidential involvement operates on many institutional and
psychological levels, see Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 95, at 65-67, and because the presi-
dent can fire agency heads or obstruct their conduct using other means, see supra notes 72, 141 and
accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 229-231 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 229-231 and accompanying text.
February 2009]
Michigan Law Review
agency-provided records supply an adequate basis for relevant-factor analy-
sis in most cases, courts should inquire further when the circumstances
222
require. Because presidential involvement increases the risk that agencies
will consider irrelevant factors, it represents an "extremely compelling" cir-
cumstance of the kind identified in Vermont Yankee. 223 As such, presidential
involvement calls for additional procedural scrutiny.
The scholarly debate about presidential involvement suggests two addi-
tional obstacles to arbitrary and capricious review, both of which are easily
overcome. First is the judicial presumption that presidents have constitu-
tional authority to direct agencies' case decisions. By turning a blind eye to
224letter directives, signing statements, and other aggressive measures, the
judiciary implies that that the president has case-level directive authority.
• 225
Yet the Constitution does not explicitly provide such authority, and inter-
preting the Constitution to allow it is a self-defeating proposition. If the
president directs case decisions without statutory authorization, then he ig-
nores Supreme Court precedent establishing the "intelligible principle"
rule-the satisfaction of which is necessary to render case decisions appro-S • 226
priate under the nondelegation doctrine.
Second is the judicial presumption that Congress-to-agency delegations
run to the president-that the president has statutory grounds for directive
authority in each case. Courts have implicitly relied on this theory in cases
like Sierra Club and in declining to exercise arbitrary and capricious review
in situations of presidential involvement. Yet the weight of available evi-
dence discourages this approach. Congress is typically explicit when it
delegates authority to the president: it cannot be assumed to delegate to him
227whenever it delegates to an agency. While an agency's directive authority
may limit presidential discretion, such limitations are not inconsistent with
the idea of a unitary executive. 22' The Framers intended to foster intrabranch
222. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
223. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 543
(1978) (noting that the development of an agency's decision-making record is warranted in "ex-
tremely compelling circumstances").
224. See supra note 100.
225. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
226. As Part H noted, nonlegislative entities lack lawmaking authority and may only exercise
delegated congressional authority when Congress provides "intelligible principles" for them to
abide by. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. Interpreting the Constitution to allow the
president directive authority is equivalent to granting him independent lawmaking authority (which
he patently does not have). Such an interpretation would allow the president to ignore the "intelligi-
ble principles" rule, which presumes that his authority is statutory.
227. Stack, supra note 5, at 276-99. Proponents of a strict unitary executive may object that
regardless of what Congress aims at, it can only hit the president; that he is the executive branch.
But the fact that the Framers anticipated intrabranch disagreement discourages this view. See infra
note 229.
228. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 709 (providing an interpretation of Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926), and the unitary-executive theory more generally).
[Vol. 107:643
Irrelevant Oversight
disagreement, 29 and this works to ensure that important decisions involve a
modicum of debate and deliberation.2 It also makes intuitive sense that
Congress should determine the recipients of its delegated authority since
specific problems call for specific competencies and such authority is not
always executive in nature.23 The president remains a unitary executive,
despite these encroachments, because he can trump an agency's directive
authority at any time using his constitutionally anticipated appointment and
•232
removal powers.
C. Arbitrary and Capricious Review as a Solution to the Accountability
and Arbitrariness Critiques of Presidential Involvement
The obstacles to the application of arbitrary and capricious review are,
then, surmountable. And my model provides a more tailored and effective
solution to the accountability and arbitrariness critiques of presidential in-
volvement than those previously suggested. Arbitrary and capricious review
is more tailored than other solutions because courts developed it to police
the informal rulemaking contexts where presidential involvement usually
takes place. It is also more effective at addressing the accountability and
arbitrariness critiques of presidential involvement. Arbitrary and capricious
review addresses the accountability critique (a) by overcoming current ob-
stacles to judicial review, both real and imagined, and (b) by intensifying the
level of review beyond that which courts and scholars have previously
deemed appropriate. It addresses the arbitrariness critique by performing
these functions and by placing the issue of arbitrariness at the center of the
reviewing court's inquiry.
A solution based on arbitrary and capricious review is well tailored to
the contexts in which presidential involvement typically takes place. As Part
I discussed, courts developed modem arbitrary and capricious review to po-
lice informal agency decision making-the kind of decision making in
• 233
which the president is most often involved. Other judicial standards are
not as well tailored for monitoring presidential involvement. While Chevron
review requires a similar analysis-whether Congress clearly indicated the
meaning of statutory language, and if not, whether the agency's interpreta-
tion is reasonable 214--it speaks to a slightly different issue and is more
229. Id. at 737-38 ("In domestic government, the Constitution is explicit that Congress may
create duties for heads of departments .... Unlike army generals, who may be commanded, the
heads of departments the President appoints and the Senate confirms have the responsibility to de-
cide the issues Congress has committed to their care ... and not simply to obey.").
230. See Stack, supra note 5, at 310-22.
231. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935).
232. See supra note 72.
233. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
234. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984); supra note
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concerned with substance than procedure. An agency's decision could fall
within the realm of reasonable interpretation while still relying on irrelevant
(and thus arbitrary and impermissible) factors. While Youngstown review is
explicitly concerned with arbitrariness, moreover, it is difficult to apply be-
cause Congress is relatively incapable of speedy action... and because the
Supreme Court has developed an explicitly permissive stance in recent217
years. Youngstown review is also problematic because it asks whether
presidential involvement is appropriate at all, rather than attempting to im-
pose realistic limits."' Unlike these insufficient approaches, arbitrary and
capricious review requires courts' involvement at the micro level. Arbitrary
and capricious review forces courts both to scrutinize agencies' decision-
making processes in the appropriate amount of detail and to recognize the
inevitability of presidential involvement while drawing a statutorily defined
line between appropriate and inappropriate input.1
39
My model is also more effective at addressing critiques of presidential
involvement. It addresses the accountability critique, first of all, by debunk-
ing false assumptions about the nature of presidential involvement and
intensifying judicial scrutiny in the contexts where it is present. The advo-
cates of other solutions have not given similar consideration to the
assumptions underlying the currently high level of presidential involvement
and have often proceeded in the shadow of such assumptions. Kagan has
wrongly assumed that "Presidential Administration" should increase the
accountability of agency decision making. 24 Other scholars have neglected
the issue of accountability altogether.24' By recognizing that presidential
involvement has a likely negative effect on the accountability of agency de-
cision making, my model provides a realistic starting point for review.
By intensifying the appropriate level of review, my model enables courts
to highlight both the occurrence of presidential involvement and the reasons
motivating it. Relevant-factor analysis requires a relatively high level of
scrutiny, especially in the "exceptionally compelling" circumstances of
presidential involvement, and this has accountability-promoting implica-
tions. In light of the expanded record that such scrutiny implies, the public
235. Chevron review asks whether an agency's decision is substantively reasonable. See Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 845. Arbitrary and capricious review asks whether an agency's decision is
substantively arbitrary and whether the agency followed the correct procedures (e.g., whether it
considered relevant factors) in reaching its decision. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1971).
236. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 168.
238. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (establishing guidelines for determining whether presidential action is constitutionally
appropriate).
239. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
240. See Kagan, supra note 2, at 2378. In fairness to Kagan, however, she does contend that
modifications in the application of Chevron deference are necessary to ensure such an increase in
accountability. Id. at 2376-77.
241. See supra Section I.C.
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will likely see the president's and the agency's contributions, distinguish
them from each other, and hold each entity accountable. Knowing that the
appropriateness of their decisions hinges on the courts' ability to discern the
true reasons underlying them, moreover, the president and the agency will
act transparently in the first instance. Despite its similar potential to increase
accountability, Michelle Gilman's Youngstown inquiry is less fact-intensive
than my model and is more about upholding an abstract separation of pow-
ers than upholding statutory intent. The Court's efforts to undermine
Youngstown stand in contrast to its silence about the use of arbitrary and
capricious review, which ostensibly favors my model's application.242
My model also addresses the arbitrariness critique of presidential in-
volvement by dispensing with false assumptions, intensifying scrutiny, and
focusing on the issue of arbitrariness more explicitly than previously articu-
lated solutions. Dispensing with false assumptions has as many benefits for
nonarbitrariness as it does for accountability. The above accountability-
promoting implications are ultimately a by-product of arbitrary and capri-
cious review's main purpose: to identify and uphold congressional intent
and to maintain the rule of law by limiting the discretion of congressional
delegates.'" Courts first developed arbitrary and capricious review as a solu-
tion to the arbitrariness concerns that attended the emergence of the
administrative state;245 these are the same concerns that (a) the presidential
control model is noteworthy for ignoring,246 and (b) provide the basis for the
current arbitrariness critique.24' The requirement that agencies must base
decisions on relevant factors provides an applicable rule of law and places it
at the forefront of the court's inquiry. It also recognizes the judiciary's
presumptive expertise in upholding this rule of law. As Part II noted, the
proponents of other solutions have either prevented the judiciary from exer-
cising its Marbury role or have appointed less-traditional, less-capable
actors in its stead.249 My model corrects this significant mistake.
CONCLUSION
The intensification of presidential involvement has sparked decades of
debate. But while critics have convincingly identified the need to ensure that
agency decisions remain accountable and nonarbitrary, they have not yet
presented a compelling means of realizing these goals. This Note argues that
242. Compare Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (inquiring generally about the overlap of constitu-
tional powers), with Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (conducting a detailed assessment of each factor that the agency considered).
243. See supra notes 100, 168.
244. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
247. See supra Section II.B.
248. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
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arbitrary and capricious review is the best means of addressing the account-
ability and arbitrariness critiques of presidential involvement. As this Note
demonstrates, arbitrary and capricious review is applicable in all situations
of presidential involvement. It puts the existing scholarship to work by en-
couraging a new focus on the holder of directive authority. In turn, this new
focus resolves the problems of nonaccountability and arbitrariness by tack-
ling false assumptions about the nature of presidential involvement and by
heightening judicial scrutiny. Unlike previously suggested solutions, arbi-
trary and capricious review also puts courts in their properly active capacity
by requiring them to discern and uphold statutory intent. As presidential
involvement continues to escalate, the judiciary should adjust its practice
and apply this underappreciated doctrine to full effect.
